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ON THE ROAD TO THE EURO ZONE. 





 The aim of this article is to show the threats connected with the exchange rate stabilization 
within the framework of ERM II and the analysis of the randomly selected EU countries – 
candidates for the  Euro Zone. A two year stabilization of the exchange rate within the ERM 
II required prior to the Euro Zone accession is connected with numerous risks typical of a 
fixed rate with a hard band of fluctuations. There are two ways of exchange rate stabilization 
– a standard one as in the case of the Slovenian Tolar or a currency board (the case of the 
Baltic states). Neither of them is free of drawbacks. Against this background a question can be 
formulated: is the exchange rate stabilization indispensable for the Euro Zone accession at all? 
More and more arguments are raised against it. The most relevant ones refer to the criteria of 
price stability and fiscal stability. Stabilization of the exchange rate within the ERM II for two 
years in the situation of free capital flows may not be successful and there is a probability of 
the currency crisis in the country stabilizing the exchange rate. 
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  11.  Exchange rate systems and the factors determining their choice 
 
Theory and practice distinguish the following exchange rate systems:
2 
•  flexible  (floating) rate of exchange, 
•  fixed rate of exchange with a band of fluctuations including its variation – a currency 
board, 
•  indirect systems: 
o  crawling peg, 
o  adjustable peg, 
o  managed floating. 
Each of these systems has some advantages and disadvantages. 
A floating rate of exchange is purely a market solution and thus it releases a central bank from 
the necessity of interventions in foreign currency. A floating rate of exchange has an in-built 
mechanism ensuring the balance of payments equilibrium. What is more, the floating system 
isolates economy from external monetary disturbances and, gradually and in a flexible way, it 
adjusts to structural changes in economy. It is also important that in a floating exchange rate 
system the probability of a currency crisis is decreased whereas economies which apply a 
fixed rate of exchange are exposed to this crisis.
3 
 
On the other hand, it must be borne in mind that despite the above mentioned features of a 
floating exchange rate, monetary and fiscal authorities of the country should apply a 
consistent stabilization policy aiming at ensuring the internal equilibrium. This exchange rate 
does not, however, protect economy against an import of disturbances of the extra-monetary 
type, e.g. a shift of the foreign demand to exports, changes in terms of trade or cost-related 
inflation  connected with the rise of raw material prices in world markets.
4 It must be also 
emphasized that in the situation of a floating exchange rate fiscal policy is less effective in 
comparison with the system of a fixed exchange rate. Besides, its effectiveness depends on 
the degree of capital mobility.  This is indicated by the analyses carried out according to the 
Fleming-Mundell model.
5 The scope of this stabilization policy depends on the flexibility of 
markets as well as prices and wages. This is the degree of market flexibility which determines 
the effectiveness of market adjustments in economy. The higher this effectiveness is, the 
lesser the scope of indispensable stabilization policy. 
 
A drawback of a floating exchange rate is, among others, big uncertainty concerning financial 
market participants’ behavior and a high exchange rate risk. The so-called managed floating is 
a pure attempt to eliminate the exchange rate system drawbacks. This type of exchange rate is 
regulated by the market mechanism. Yet the central bank has the right to intervene especially 
in the situation of different types of external economic shocks. Literature points to the danger 
of the exchange rate manipulation in the situation when the right of the central bank to 
intervene in exchange rate is decreed and the central bank is not autonomous enough to 
pursue the target which is price stability.
6 
 
A fixed (rigid) rate with a band of fluctuations (in other words, “the tunnel”) allows for 
reduction of the exchange rate risk. Fiscal policy in the system of a fixed exchange rate is 
                                                 
2 See [Lutkowski, 1998, pp. 51-52; Bożyk, Mijala, Puławski, 2002, pp. 233-238; Melvin, 2000, pp. 57-59]. 
3 It refers mainly to the so-called  II generation crises based on speculation attacks. See more: [Malecki, 
Sławiński, Piasecki, Żuławska, 2001, pp. 17-19]. 
4 See more: [Lutkowski, 1998, pp. 52-66]. 
5 See [Acocella, 2002, pp. 493-523; Caves, Frankel, Jones, 1998, pp. 586-633, Van Marrewijk, 2005, p. 58]; 
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  2more effective at a relatively ineffective monetary policy which again depends on the degree 
of capital mobility. In this system there is no automatic mechanism providing equilibrium to 
the balance of payments and monetary authorities must take care of foreign currency reserves, 
which are indispensable to accomplish exchange rate interventions aiming at the protection of 
the exchange rate. Nevertheless, a more significant problem related to the fixed exchange rate 
must be mentioned. This problem is called the impossible trinity concept (see Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1:  Impossible triangle 
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Source: author’s own development based on Pentecost, 2001. 
According to this concept it is impossible to have all three, namely:  exchange rate stability, 
autonomous monetary policy and capital mobility (free capital flows) fulfilled at the same 
time. In the situation of a fixed exchange rate and full capital mobility, the pursuit of 
monetary policy independence can lead to the lack of the balance of payments equilibrium 
owing to the speculative capital flows. If the country has an autonomous monetary policy and 
the exchange rate is fixed, then, in order to protect the balance of payments, the country must 
control capital flows. An alternative solution is to resign from the fixed exchange rate and to 
apply the floating rate. Still another solution is to resign from the independent monetary 
policy and join a larger monetary area.
7 
 
A special case of a fixed exchange rate is the currency board. It consists in establishing a 
parity exchange rate (vis-a-vis another currency or gold) and ensuring at least 100% coverage 
of banknote and coin issue with the foreign currency or gold reserves being the parity basis of 
the currency board. In this way monetary policy is practically abolished. The market exchange 
rate fluctuations against the parity exchange rate are limited by the size of the domestic 
currency issue, which, in turn, depends on changes in foreign exchange reserves. In the 
orthodox version of the currency issuing office, the central bank does not neutralize the 
influence of the balance of payments on money supply, does not control foreign currencies, 
does not specify interest rates, neither does it specify obligatory reserves for commercial 
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  3banks nor play the role of the last resort lender. Thus, commercial banks cannot expect 
financial support in the case of financial liquidity problems. In practice, currency boards are 
seldom orthodox and central banks retain part or the whole of the above mentioned rights. 
The currency board is usually used in small, open economies threatened by inflation which 
encounter problems with a consistent and credible monetary policy. Literature mentions the 
following advantages of the currency board system: stability of prices and interest rates, 
immunity to foreign currency speculation attacks, and high credibility in the eyes of investors. 
Despite its effectiveness in price and currency stabilization, this system has a number of 
drawbacks. They include, among others: restricted economic sovereignty of the country, 
limited possibilities of effective stabilization of economy with the help of monetary policy in 
the context of economic shocks.
8 
Therefore fulfillment of specific conditions on which effectiveness of adjustment systems 
depends is required. They include: fiscal stabilization and discipline, market flexibility and, in 
particular, that of the labor market, labor force mobility, flexibility of prices and wages and a 
developed  banking system. 
 
K. Lutkowski lists specific features of economy among the factors determining the choice of 
the currency exchange rate. He identifies them as: (1) size of economy and its share in the 
world’s economy, (2) degree of flexibility of markets, prices and wages and the allocation 
function played by the price-wage mechanism, (3) significance of given economy as a 




Big economies having a large share in world’s economy choose floating exchange rates 
rather. These economies have a large share of the inexchangeable goods (nontradables) sector 
and a relatively small share of trade turnover with abroad in GDP. This makes them immune 
to any disturbances related to changes in exchange rates. The situation is different with small 
economies. An exception here are small economies being important financial centres in 
world’s economy, which is connected with large capital flows.
10 Similarly the fixed exchange 
rate systems are typical of innovative economies the growth of which is based on expanding 
exports. A floating exchange rate allows for solving the problem of excessive foreign 
exchange reserves increasing due to permanent export surpluses. 
 
On the other hand, low market, price and wage flexibility, and frequently their rigidity, 
encourage to choose a fixed exchange rate rather  than a floating one. Economies of this type 
adjust with difficulty to any changes in foreign environment as well as in exchange rates. 
 
2.  Fixed exchange rate – macroeconomic risks in the situation of international capital 
flows 
 
Implementation of a fixed exchange rate with a hard band of fluctuations may lead to specific 
costs and macroeconomic risks. Some of them were suggested above. Macroeconomic risks 
and costs of maintaining a fixed exchange rate include, among others: necessity to neutralize 
the influence of increasing foreign assets denominated in foreign currencies on internal prices 
(currency sterilization), cost and effectiveness of foreign exchange interventions, a 
                                                 
8 See more: [A.M. Gulde, , M. Kähkönen, P. Keller,2000; Hanke, , pp. 203-222; Melvin , 2000, pp. 57-59; 
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9 See [Lutkowski, 1998, pp. 69-70], see also: [Mundell, 1961; Melvin, 2000, pp. 50-54]. 
10 See [Lutkowski, 1998, p. 69]. 
  4phenomenon of “reserve escape”/outflow in the event of a balance of payments deficit, and 
speculation attacks. 
The money issue policy in a country applying a fixed exchange rate is subordinated to the 
necessity of exchange rate stabilization, maintaining it within the band determined by the 
allowed fluctuation margin. This means the necessity to use costly foreign exchange 
interventions based on foreign currency sales and purchases. The size of monetary base is, to 
a large extent, determined by external factors resulting, first of all, from the monetary policy 
of the country whose currency is the main component of currency reserves of the country 
applying a fixed exchange rate.
11 
 
Neutralizing the influence of growing currency reserves on domestic prices (inflation 
impulse) requires periodical interventions of the central bank (currency sterilization) in the 
form of open market operations. In this case, currency sterilization does not solve the problem 
for ever but only relieves (mitigates) temporarily effects of growing reserves. Sterilization 
intervention requires a developed market of treasury bonds. It must be also taken into 
consideration that issuing and selling of treasury bonds is not unlimited. 
 
In the case of reserve outflows caused by a balance of payments deficit, the country is forced 
to take foreign loans and credits stabilizing the balance of payments in order to ensure 
appropriate liquidity in settlements with abroad.  This clearly limits the freedom of economic 
policy activities.
12 
Currency speculation is a serious threat connected with the application of a fixed exchange 
rate with a fixed band of fluctuations. Stability or instability of the exchange rate is 
determined by fiscal policy implemented by the government. Expansive fiscal policy leads to 
a budget deficit and increased public debt. Its other result are growing interest rates which 
attract foreign capital. Inflow of the speculative short-term foreign capital entails domestic 
currency appreciation. Currency appreciation has an adverse influence on export 
competitiveness but improves import profitability. Consequently, the current account 
deteriorates. A negative current account balance is covered by the inflow of foreign capital. If 
short-term investors find out that the existing currency reserves of a country are not sufficient 
to protect the currency exchange rate, then they start to get profits by selling domestic 
currency for foreign currency and withdraw from the market. If foreign currency reserves are 
really too low in relation to the negative balance of money turnover, then the only solution to 
the situation is to devaluate the currency or apply a floating exchange rate. 
 
Effectiveness of economy stabilization mechanisms in the situation of a fixed exchange rate 
depends on the following institutional  conditions: 
•  developed and regulated financial system, 
•  sufficient level of currency reserves, 
•  fiscal discipline, 
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  53.  Exchange rate stabilization within the ERM II versus remaining convergence 
criteria 
 
In conformity with the Maastricht Treaty each and every country of the European Union has 
the right and duty to participate in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). However, in 
order to join the EMU a given country must meet certain criteria indicating its readiness to 
participate in the single currency area, which the Union is. These are the above mentioned 
convergence criteria formulated in the Maastricht Treaty and then specified by the European 
Monetary Institute. They include:
14 
•  price stability: the average annual inflation rate in the candidate country for the EMU 
cannot exceed the average annual inflation rate in 3 member countries with the lowest 
inflation by more than 1.5 points, 
•  fiscal stability: limiting the budget deficit (the top limit of the budget deficit to GDP 
ratio in a given country cannot be more than 3%); limiting the public debt (the global 
amount of internal debt cannot exceed 60% of the GDP value calculated on annual 
basis), 
•  long-term interest rate: the long-term interest rate on treasury bonds in a given country 
cannot exceed 2 percentage points of the average interest rates reported in 3 countries 
with the lowest inflation rates, 
•  exchange-rate stabilization: participation of the EMU candidate country’s currency in 
the ERM II (Exchange Rate Mechanism II) within the standard band of fluctuations 
(+/- 15%) for the period of at least two years without devaluation against the 
currencies of the system member countries.
15 
The price stability criterion was adopted for several reasons. Firstly, there were fears 
(especially in Germany) that in future the European Monetary Union can face inflation. It was 
Germany which insisted on adoption of this criterion at the same time striving to have the 
future monetary policy in the Union run analogically to that of the Bundesbank. In this way 
the countries with low inflation wanted to safeguard themselves against the Union’s central 
bank policy which was based on preferences of the countries with high inflation. 
 
It is also worth mentioning that convergent low inflation rates in the EU countries encourage 
economic growth by reducing uncertainty in economic activities. Convergent inflation rates 
and maintaining them at a low level allows also for limiting the risk of social conflicts which 
destabilize economic life. 
 
The fiscal stability criterion was based on similar reasons as the price stability criterion. In the 
past, majority of countries joining the EMU had some serious problems with budget deficits 
of structural character. Growing budget deficits and growing public debt led to crowding-out 
of private consumption and investment expenditures, which limited possibilities of economic 
growth in the long-run. It was also the reason for a high taxation burden for population and 
enterprises, which in turn, had an adverse effect on economic effectiveness and international 
competitiveness of economy. Introduction of this criterion, without doubt, contributed to 
accelerated reforms of public finance in individual countries. 
 
However, it must be borne in mind that introduction of the reference values in the form of a 
3%  budget deficit to GDP ratio and a 60% public debt to GDP ratio was arbitrary and was not 
                                                 
14 [The euro: explanatory notes by Directorate General II – Economic and Financial Affairs, 1998, p. 13-14]. 
15 ERM II was set up by the decree of the European Council In June 1997 in Amsterdam. See: [ The Euro and 
Economic Policy …, 1999, p. 129-133]. 
  6substantiated by economic theory or practice. The said values were adopted under the 
influence of Germany. The point was to avoid higher interest rates resulting from excessive 
growth of a budget deficit and public debt in the whole territory of the Union, detrimental to 
the countries reporting lower interest rates at the moment the Union was created. In those 
days Germany was one of such countries. 
 
The long-term interest rate criterion results from the conviction that this rate indicates 
sustainable economic effects in the sphere of price stability in particular member countries. 
Besides,  reduced differences among interest rates allow avoidance of arbitration in financial 
markets, especially in the period  when there are many currencies with a fixed exchange rate. 
 
The exchange rate stability criterion means stabilization of exchange rates in the countries – 
candidates for the Economic and Monetary Union within the framework of the ERM II 
(Exchange Rate Mechanism II). The ERM II was set up by the decree of the European 
Council made in Amsterdam on 17 June 1997. 
 
Participation in the ERM II is voluntary. The exchange rate mechanism is based on central 
exchange rates established against the Euro. The fluctuation margin in relation to the central 
exchange rate is +/- 15%. The national central bank of a country from outside the Economic 
and Monetary Union joining the ERM II concludes an agreement with the European Central 
Bank, which regulates operational procedures concerning introduction of central exchange 
rates. It is also assumed that the country does not apply any foreign currency related 
restrictions. 
 
Stabilization  of a given country’s exchange rate within the framework of the ERM II for two 
years means that despite the lack of foreign currency-related restrictions the exchange rate 
undergoes minimal fluctuations around the central exchange rate. This proves the possibility 
of joining a single currency area. Replacement of such currency with a single currency is only 
a confirmation of the naturally existing state of affairs. 
 
In the two-year period of the exchange rate stabilization in the candidate country for the 
European Monetary Union within the framework of the ERM II, all the above described risks 
related to the transition from a floating to a fixed exchange rate may occur. The narrower the 
acceptable band of fluctuations is, the stronger the possibility of their occurrence. At present it 
is +/- 15% but a possibility of narrowing it to +/- 2.5% is under discussion. 
 
There is a significant relationship between exchange rate stability within the ERM II and the 
remaining convergence criteria, in particular fiscal stability conditions. 
 
It must be emphasized that the EU member countries’ exchange rates function within a 
uniform financial market and hence, in the situation of high capital mobility on the 
international scale. This entails significant consequences for economic policy. As the analysis 
of the Fleming-Mundell model indicates, in the situation of high capital mobility and a fixed 
exchange rate, fiscal policy- unlike monetary policy - has a favorable effect on GDP growth. 
In this case, expansive monetary policy leads to a large outflow of foreign currency reserves. 
 
Price stability (low inflation) and exchange rate stability are significant factors deciding about 
success of an undertaking which is making the currency exchange rate against the Euro fixed. 
In order to ensure exchange rate stability, monetary authorities of a country should try to 
ensure a narrow band of fluctuations for  domestic inflation against foreign inflation and a 
  7narrow band of fluctuations for interest rates close to the interest rate parity. Otherwise, when 
the inflation rate fluctuates more than the average in the EMU countries, a strong pressure 
may occur toward currency depreciation. The latter can lead to the outflow of foreign capital 
and, consequently, an unbalanced balance of payments and loss of foreign currency reserves. 
On the other hand, significant upward fluctuation of interest rates from the currency parity 
will attract short-term speculation capital, thus leading towards currency appreciation. The 
exchange rate approaching the limits of the band outlined by the acceptable fluctuation 
margin is dangerous and encourages speculation attacks. Besides, it requires costly   
interventions in foreign currency.. 
 
The price level in the economy of a country of a relatively low economic development level 
and being a candidate for the European Monetary Union is determined, among others, by two 
basic factors. They include the Samuelson-Balasa effect
16 and a pro-inflation effect of a 
budget deficit. These factors affect also the growth of interest rates. 
 
The pro-inflation influence of the Samuelson-Balassa effect is revealed, first of all, in the 
economies which based their economic growth on liberalization of economic exchange with 
abroad (among others, the case of new EU members). In this type of economies productivity 
grows in the sector of exchangeable goods (tradables) leading to higher wages.  By virtue of 
imitation (copying) (also due to the pressure of Trade Unions) the growth of salaries is 
transferred to the sector of non-exchangeable goods (non-tradables) where the pace of wage 
increase starts to be ahead of labor productivity. As a result, internal demand occurs, which is 
followed by a price rise. In the long run, productivity growth leads also to domestic currency 
appreciation. 
 
A budget deficit and public debt resulting from it affect the price level as well as interest 
rates. Growth of a budget deficit stimulates inflation expectations. Moreover, the open market 
operations carried out in order to stabilize the exchange rate may influence the growth of 
monetary base when the central bank buys  treasury bonds to prevent excessive currency 
appreciation. 
 
A budget deficit and public debt influence also growth of interest rates and these, in turn, 
exert pressure on currency appreciation pushing the exchange rate towards the bottom limit of 
the acceptable band of fluctuations. It is worth mentioning that public debt is connected with 
the issue of treasury bonds which are an attractive investment instrument for banks. Through 
the portfolio crowding out effect it leads to maintaining high interest rates on bank credits and 
a large spread between the interest rate on budget credits and the one on bank deposits. 
Nevertheless, interest rates on deposits and interest rates on treasury bonds are usually above 
the interest rates abroad. High interest rates domestically in relation to foreign interest rates 
and attractiveness of treasury bonds for foreign investors attract first of all short-term capital. 
 
A budget deficit is usually accompanied by a current account deficit. Maintaining a  high 
budget deficit and a current account deficit is a negative signal for foreign investors and 
increases probability of their withdrawing capital from a given country. This, in turn, 
increases the risk of the currency crisis occurrence. 
 
Therefore, it is important for a country joining the ERM II to have a stable situation in the 
area of public finances. The ERM II accession should be preceded by a deep reform of public 
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  8finance whose aim is to stop growth of a budget deficit and public debt and then to bring them 
to a low level measured by their share in GDP. Taking into account the convergence criteria, 
they should be fulfilled prior to the ERM II accession. Otherwise, the exchange rate will 
fluctuate dangerously and the threat of the whole undertaking’s failure will grow. It must also 
be emphasized that it is not only the nominal convergence criteria that must be fulfilled. 
Fulfillment  of the nominal convergence criteria should be a result of the real convergence 
processes. 
 
Reforms and economy restructuring in a country aspiring to join the ERM II should rely, 
among others, on deregulation processes. What is meant here is the creation of conditions for 
flexible functioning of markets, including the labor market. Because in the situation of a 
flexible exchange rate (fixed against the Euro) and high capital mobility possibilities of 
applying economic policy are more limited than in the case of floating exchange rates  (and 
even fixed ones but with a possibility of devaluation and revaluation), the main burden of 
adjustments in the two-year period of stabilization as well as later, after the domestic currency 
has been replaced by the Euro, will rest on flexible market mechanisms. It is of special 
importance should the demand-side or supply-side shocks occur during the period of the 
exchange rate stabilization against the Euro. 
 
Another important issue is the domestic currency exchange rate at the moment it is fixed 
against the Euro in relation to the long-term balance of payment equilibrium. If the domestic 
currency exchange rate against the Euro is overvaluated, then, it means that the current 
account balance deteriorates due to the decreased competitiveness of exports and outflow of 
foreign exchange reserves. Lower competitiveness of exports and a negative balance of the 
current account  can be maintained for a longer period of time causing negative recessive 
effects for economy. What must be recalled here is the case of the former Democratic 
Republic of Germany where within the economic union with the Federal Republic of 
Germany the basic conversion rate of the East-German mark into West-German mark was 
adopted at the level 1:1. This meant that the East-German mark was appreciated by almost 
450% in relation to the West-German mark. The effects of this move meant a slump in 
exports from the former Democratic Republic of Germany, numerous bankruptcies of 
enterprises and a long-term recession.
17 
 
4.  Experiences of selected EU countries in stabilizing the exchange rate against Euro 
 
Effects of exchange rate stabilization against the Euro within the ERM II as well as outside 
this mechanism in the case when the exchange rate is fixed against the Euro one-sidedly, can 
be examined on the basis of experiences of several EU member countries. 
 
In Ireland the exchange rate stabilization process was started with the accession to the 
European Monetary System in 1979. In the period from 1979 to 1999, the Irish pound was 
devalued several times. The first devaluation took place in March 1983. Just before the 
accession to the European Monetary Union, at the end of 1998, the Irish pound was devalued 
again. It ensured higher competitiveness of Irish exports, which was one of the factors 
contributing to economic success of Ireland in the following years. It must be mentioned here 
that the fulfillment of the remaining convergence criteria by Ireland resulted, to a large extent, 
from deep liberal economic reforms which took place in the 1970s and 1980s.
18 
 
                                                 
17 See: [Bukowski, 2003, p. 73]. 
18 See: [Keenan, 2003]. 
  9Also Danish experiences are interesting. In 1993, following the European Currency System 
(ESW), Denmark’s Central Bank – Danmarks Nationalbank – started a one-sided policy of 
Danish krone stabilization. Denmark joined the ERM II agreement and the Danish 
government put itself under the obligation of running the economic policy in compliance with 
the requirements of the policy of a fixed exchange rate. The agreement adopted a narrower 
than acceptable in the ERM II band of exchange fluctuations: +/- 2.5%. Moreover, Danmarks 
Nationalbank started to apply interest rates reflecting the ones used by the European Central 
Bank, irrespective of the economic situation. The aim was to maintain a fixed exchange rate 
with a narrow band of fluctuations. In the  situation when the depreciation rate of krone 
exceeds the daily fluctuations, the central bank raises interest rates quickly and significantly. 
These rates, however, are reduced gradually, in the delayed manner in relation to the currency 
inflow. In this way any speculation against krone is costly and unprofitable.  The policy of 
Danmarks Nationalbank is credible for the foreign currency market participants, exporters and 
importers. They realize that  the central bank is unconditionally ready to assist the exchange 
rate.
19 Besides, it is worth mentioning that markets, including labor market in Denmark, are 
relatively flexible in comparison to other EU countries. In the 1990s, deep structural reforms 
were implemented in Denmark which included, among others, the taxation system, social 
benefits system and labor market deregulation. The carried out reforms caused that inflation 
was reduced, unemployment dropped and nominal wages increased moderately. 
 
Fiscal policy, like monetary one, was subordinated to the exchange rate and price stability. It 
was announced publicly that fiscal policy would be corrected if inflation departs from the 
definition of price stability given by the Central European Bank (0.2 percentage point growth 
of harmonized consumption price index).
20 
 
Slovenia joined the ERM II on 28 June 2004. The central exchange rate was determined at the 
level of 239.64 tolars for 1 Euro. The country in question fulfilled all the convergence criteria 
except price stability. The average inflation rate for the 12-month period preceding August 
2004 amounted to 4.1% in relation to the reference value of 2.4%. 
 
Table 1. Economic performance in Slovenia, interest rate and inflation in euro zone euro, period:  1999 – 
2006  
 
   1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
SLOVENIA                   
Short –term interest rate – interbanking market  (%)   8.64 10.94 10.87 8.03  6.78  4.66  4.03 3.58
Rate of inflation  HICP (%)  6.10 8.9 8.6 7.5  5.7  3.7  2.5 2.5
Real short –term interest rate – interbanking market  (%)  2.39 1.87 2.09 0.49  1.02  0.93  1.49 1.05
Long –term interest rate (%)  - - - -  -  2.49  3.81 3.90
Real long –term interest rate (%)   -  -  -  -   -  -1.17  1.28 1.37
Bank lending – annual change (%)  10.2 17.2 29.4 10.6  6.5  8.6  -3.0  -
Interest rate – bank deposits over 12 months.(%)   -  - 9.80 8.20  6.00  3.80  3.20 2.70
Real interest rate – bank deposits over 12 months.(%)   -  - 1.10 0.65  0.28  0.10  0.68 0.20
Interest rate  – bank loans over12 months (%)   -  - 13.50 12.30  10.40  8.60  7.70 6.80
Real interest rate  – bank loans over12 months (%)   -  - 4.51 4.47  4.45  4.73  5.07 4.20
Nominal currency rate (Tolar /EUR)  194.47 206.61 217.98 225.98  233.85  239.09  239.57 239.60
Real currency rate  183.29 174.22 170.19 169.21  177.24  192.26  201.54 196.65
Real effective currency rate  100 99.05 100.08 101.24  103.19  104.80  104.00 104.48
                                                 
19 See: [Jensen, 2001]. 
20 See: [Jensen, 2001]. 
  10Current account balance/GDP (%)  -3.3 -2.8 0.2 1.1  -0.8  -2.7  -2.0 -2.5
Foreign debt/GDP (%)    -  - 46.8 54.3  59.5  64.2  71.4 84.5
Official reserves (mln EUR)  3134.1 3403.2 5042.3 6784.6  6878.7  6889.8  6896.7  -
Dynamics of official reserves  100 108.6 148.2 134.6  101.4  100.2  100.1  -
Offical reserves/GDP (%)  15.6 16.4 22.9 28.6  27.7  26.3  25.0  -
FDI flow/GDP (%)  0.9 1.1 1.4 4.0  3.8  2.1  1.6 1.0
Net FDI/GDP (%)  0.3 0.4 1.1 6.5 -0.5  0.8 -0.1 -1.0
Net portfolio investment/GDP (%)  1.6 0.8 0.3 -0.3  -0.9  -2.2  -4.5 -4.2
General government  
 balance/ GDP (%)   -2.0 -3.8 -4.1 -2.5  -2.8  -2.3  -1.5 -1.4
Public debt/GDP (%)  24.9 27.4 28.4 29.1  28.6  28.9  28.4 27.8
Gross national savings/ GDP ( %)   24.1 24 24.3 24.6  24.1  24.5  24.3 24.5
Investment /GDP (%)  24.4 23.7 20.7 18.7  18.2  18.1  18.2 19.9
Real GDP growth (%)  5.4 4.1 2.7 3.5  2.7  4.4  4.0 5.2 
Euro zone                         
Short –term interest rate – interbanking market    2.96 4.39 4.26 3.32  2.33  2.11  2.19 3.08
Rate of inflation  HICP (%)  1.1 2.1 2.3 2.2  2.1  2.1  2.2 2.2
Real short –term interest rate – interbanking market  (%)  1.84 2.24 1.92 1.10  0.23  0.01  -0.01 0.86
Source: Author’s own development on the basis of the date from: [Eurostat-epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu; 
Convergence Report, ECB, December 2006; Convergence Report, ECB, May 2006; European Economy, Spring 
2007, Statistical Annex; Transition Report update 2007, EBRD, May 2007]. 
 
In those days, the tolar exchange rate was at the level close to central parity. 
21 It is 
worth noting that the budget deficit stood at the level of 2% of GDP and public debt – at the 
level of 29.1% of GDP.
22 In the years 2005-2006, Slovenia fulfilled all the convergence 
criteria.  The tolar exchange rate was relatively stable. Tolar’s appreciation against the Euro 
was negligible. On 1 January 2007, the country joined the Euro zone (See: Table. 1).   
 
In the whole period 1999-2006, real GDP growth in Slovenia was relatively high. It should be 
noted that the gross domestic savings and investment to GDP ratios were also quite high. The 
current account balance in the analyzed period was negative but its relation to GDP did not 
exceed 2.5% (except in 1999). In the analyzed period official reserves were growing and their 
ratio to GDP was quite high. Inflow of foreign investments into Slovenian economy  was 
relatively small. In the last period (2004-2006) the balance of portfolio investments was 
negative. However, this did not entail any economic perturbations. Tolar’s stability against the 
Euro resulted, first of all, from relatively restrictive fiscal and monetary policies which in the 
period 2004-2006 were subordinated mainly to currency stabilization. 
 
Close coordination of fiscal and monetary policies played a significant role in macroeconomic 
stabilization in Slovenia, in particular, in exchange rate stabilization. Until 2004, Slovenia had 
had a managed floating system. In the period 1996-2001, the central bank of Slovenia 
implemented restrictive monetary policy aiming at price stability and real exchange rate 
stability (dual targeting). In this case price stability was adopted as inflation target for non-
exchangeable goods (non-tradables) on the international scale. Monetary aggregates (M3) 
were used as indirect operational targets. In the period 2001-2006, the Central Bank of 
Slovenia based its monetary policy on the exchange rate as a nominal anchor.
23 The main 
target was exchange rate stability. Fiscal policy aimed at maintaining a low budget deficit. In 
the period 1999 – 2006 the budget expenditure to GDP ratio was reduced from 41.6 in 2000 to 
                                                 
21 Zob. [Commission Report, 2004]. 
22 Ibidem. 
23 See: [Capricolo, Lavrač, 2003; Neupauerovă, Vravec, 2007].  
  1140.7% in 2006. At the same time, it was accompanied by an increased tax burden from 38.8% 
24 of GDP in 2000 to 40.2% of GDP in 2006. This was mainly a result of higher VAT and 
excise tax rates. 
In 1999 Hungary applied a fixed exchange rate against the Euro with a band of fluctuations 
initially +/- 2.5%, and from May 2001: +/- 15% At the same time the monetary policy based 
on the direct inflation target was applied. Widening of the fluctuation band was linked to the 
strong pressure on the forint appreciation. It was caused by several factors: higher interest 
rates attracting foreign capital, a relatively high budget deficit (9.2% in 2002), the Samuelson 
–Balassa effect. Forint appreciation lasted until January 2003. The, the central bank –NBH – 
started buying euros. At the same time, within two days, interest rates were reduced. It caused 
increased money supply and a threat to the inflation target in 2003. In June 2003, NBH 
devalued the forint. This, however, contributed to the increased pressure on forint 
depreciation. The reason why the forint fluctuated was the lack of coordination between the 
monetary and fiscal policies and sending negative signals to the financial market participants 
by the central bank – NBH. Financial market participants perceived the interest rate reduction 
and exchange rate intervention to protect the forint as a resignation from the inflation target 
attainment for the benefit of another target being the exchange rate. Forint devaluation caused 
that the central bank’s policy was not very credible and was presented as a compromise 
between the government and the NBH. The government was said to accept the budget deficit 
reduction in exchange for the currency devaluation and reduced interest rates. This example 
shows what kind of problems with currency stabilization are caused by lack of fiscal stability 
and coordination of fiscal and monetary policies.
25 
 
Experiences of two new EU countries – Estonia and Lithuania, which joined the ERM II on 
27 July 2004 – are equally interesting. A characteristic feature of the exchange rate systems of 
both countries is adoption of a currency board. The currency board system in both countries 
was not and is not of orthodox nature. It was assumed that Euro reserves will cover only the 
monetary base and central banks will be the final creditors. The origins of a currency board in 
both countries are similar.  After they had achieved independence, they noted high inflation. 
At the same time both countries became highly open economies relatively quickly. Foreign 
currency-related restrictions were abolished and capital flows became liberalized. Estonia 
established a currency board in 1992 and pegged it to the Deutsche Mark. In 1999 both 
countries switched to the Euro as the reference currency. Lithuania introduced the system in 
1994 and adopted the American dollar as the reference currency which was replaced by the 
Euro in 2002. The currency board experiment turned out to be extremely successful in 
reducing inflation and stabilizing economies in both countries. In 2004 both countries fulfilled 
the criteria of fiscal stability, price stability and long-term interest rates. 
 
The ECB agreement concerning the ERM II accession says that these countries will keep their 
currency board systems while accepting additional obligations resulting from the ERM II 
membership. As Convergence Reports for the years 2004-2007 indicate, the currencies of 
both countries did not report deviations from central parities against the Euro.
26 
 
Bulgaria introduced the currency board system in 1997 adopting the German mark as the 
reference currency which was replaced in 1999 by the Euro. Introduction of the currency 
board system was also treated in this country as a remedy against inflation, as it was in 
Estonia and Lithuania. Also in the case of Bulgaria this system proved effective in economy 
                                                 
24 See: [Public finance In EMU 2007, Statistical Annex] 
25 See: [Gabrisch, 2002; Tchorek, 2003, pp. 183-184]. 
26 See more:  [Convergence Report, ECB, 2004, 2006, 2007; Bogdanovičius, 2002; Sŏrg, 2004]. 
  12stabilization. The aim of Bulgarian authorities is also to introduce the lev to the ERM II while 
maintaining the currency board system. 
 
All three countries experienced problems only at the turn of 2005 and 2006. 
In the years 1999-2006 Estonia, Lithuania and Bulgaria were characterized by high economic 
growth.  The investment rate exceeded the gross domestic savings rate. This was reflected by 
the increased negative balance of current account and the foreign debt (especially in Estonia). 
Moreover, since 1999 all three countries have reported real currency appreciation and real 
effective exchange rate growth, which were reflected by lower competitiveness of exports.  
Real currency appreciation in the analyzed countries was mainly a result of the increased 
inflation rate and a large inflow of foreign capital in the form of foreign direct investments 
and EU funds (see Table 2). 
 
In all three countries the EU funds which came in the years 2005-2005 accounted for 3.5% of 
GDP.
27 However, in 2006, Estonia indicated a drop in foreign direct investments. Both 
Estonia and Lithuania revealed a negative balance of foreign portfolio investments in 2005 
and 2006 (see Table 2). It seems it was a reaction to negative real short-term interest rates 
which appeared in these countries in that period in the interbanking markets as well as in the 
case of bank deposits. However, in all three countries the interest rates on credits and loans 
were positive. Negative real interest rates in the interbanking market and on deposits resulted 
from significant inflation growth in the years 2004-2006 (especially, in Estonia and Bulgaria). 
 
Table 2. Currency board   and economic performance in Estonia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, interest rate and 
inflation in euro zone euro, period:  1999 – 2006 
  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
ESTONIA  
Short –term interest rate – interbanking market  
(%)   7.81 5.68 5.31 3.88 2.92 2.50 2.38 3.16 
Rate of inflation  HICP (%)  3.10 3.90 5.60 3.60 1.40 3.00 4.10 4.40 
Real short –term interest rate – interbanking 
market  (%)  4.57 1.71  -0.27 0.27 1.50 -0.49 -1.65 -1.19 
Long –term interest rate (%)   -   -   -   -   -   -   -   - 
Real long –term interest rate (%)   -   -   -   -   -   -   -   - 
Bank lending – annual change (%)  10.6 28.5 19.4 22.2 40.0 34.4 35.7    - 
Interest rate – bank deposits over 12 months.(%)    -    - 4.50 3.70 2.40 2.10 2.30 3.60 
Real interest rate – bank deposits over 12 
months.(%)   -   -  -1.04  0.10  0.99  -0.87  -1.73  -0.77 
Interest rate  – bank loans over12 months (%)   -   -  10.1  6.6  5.1  6.2  9.2  7.7 
Real interest rate  – bank loans over12 months (%)   -   -  4.3  2.9  3.6  3.1  4.9  3.2 
Nominal currency rate (kroon/EUR)  15.65 15.65 15.65 15.65 15.65 15.65 15.65 15.65 
Real currency rate*  15.34  15.11 14.23 14.82 16.19 14.84 13.75 13.20 
Real effective currency rate  100.00 93.89 94.00 97.23  103.36 106.3  107.98  110.31 
Current account balance/GDP (%)  -4.4  -5.3  -5.4  -9.8 -11.6 -12.5 -10.5 -13.9 
Foreign debt/GDP (%)    -   - 53.0  64..4 73.6 86.0 86.7 86.2 
Official reserves (mln EUR)  852.2 992.1 930.0 957.7  1098.3  1316.8  1647.2    - 
Dynamics of official reserves  100 116.4  93.7 103.0 114.7 119.9 125.1    - 
Official reserves/GDP (%)  16.3 16.3 13.4 12.3 12.6 13.7 14.7  - 
FDI flow/GDP (%)  5.4  7.0  8.7 4.0 9.7 8.3  21.2 9.8 
Net FDI/GDP (%)  3.9  5.9  5.5 2.2 8.1 6.0  16.8 3.5 
Net portfolio investment/GDP (%)  0.2 1.5  -0.6  2 1.8 6.2  -15.8  -7.5 
General government  
 balance/ GDP (%)   -3.7  -0.2  -0.3 0.4 2.0 2.3 2.3 3.8 
Public debt/GDP (%)  6.0  4.7 4.7 5.6 5.7 5.2 4.4 4.1 
                                                 
27  See: [Accessing EU funds in the new member states: best practice from around Europe. Briefing paper, 
Economist Corporate Network, “The Economist, Vienna , March 2005].  
 
  13Gross national savings/ GDP ( %)   20.3 24.2 24.1 22.9 23.1 23.4 27.1 26.7 
Investment /GDP (%)  24.7  26  26.7 29.8 31.7 31.4 30.6 34.1 
Real GDP growth (%)  0.3  10.8 7.7 8.0 7.2 8.3  10.2  11.2 
LITHUANIA 
Short –term interest rate – interbanking market  
(%)    13.89 8.64 5.93 3.74 2.84 2.68 2.43 3.11 
Rate of inflation  HICP (%)  1.50 1.10 1.60 0.30  -1.10 1.20 2.70 3.80 
Real short –term interest rate – interbanking 
market  (%)  12.21  7.46  4.26  3.43 3.98 1.46  -0.26  -0.66 
Long –term interest rate (%)  -  -  - 5.97 5.22 4.43 3.73  4.0 
Real long –term interest rate (%)   -   -   -  5.65  6.39  3.19  1.00  0.19 
Bank lending – annual change (%)  9.70 -3.20 24.80 29.40 56.20 40.60 63.50    - 
Interest rate – bank deposits over 12 months.(%)    -    - 0.80 0.30 0.20 0.20 0.30 0.30 
Real interest rate – bank deposits over 12 
months.(%)   -   -  -0.8  0.0  1.3  -1.0  -2.3  -3.4 
Interest rate  – bank loans over 12 months (%)   -   -  8.10  6.10  5.10  5.60  5.60  5.50 
Real interest rate  – bank loans over 12 months 
(%)    -    - 6.40 5.78 6.27 4.35 2.82 1.64 
Nominal currency rate (LIT/EUR)   -   -   -  3.45  3.45  3.45  3.45  3.45 
Real currency rate*   -   -   -  3.52  3.68  3.55  3.39  3.19 
Real effective currency rate  100 98.15 93.14 97.52  100.66  101.67 105.3 106.8 
Current  account  balance/GDP  (%)  -11.0 -6.0 -4.7 -5.1 -6.8 -7.7 -7.2  -12.4 
Foreign debt/GDP (%)    -   - 43.4 43.8 44.9 46.6 47.7 48.5 
Official reserves (mln EUR)  1236.8 1459.9 1895.4 2314.3 2759.8 2638.1  325.9    - 
Dynamics of official reserves  100.0 118.0 129.8 122.1 119.2  95.6  12.4    - 
Official reserves/GDP (%)  12.1  11.8 14.0 15.4 16.8 14.6  1.6    - 
FDI flow/GDP (%)  4.5  3.3  3.7 5.1 1.0 3.4 4.0 6.0 
Net FDI/GDP (%)  4.4  3.3  3.6 5.0 0.8 2.3 2.6 5.1 
Net portfolio investment/GDP (%)  4.7 2.3 2.2 0.1 1.5 0.9  -1.5  -0.8 
General government  
 balance/ GDP (%)   -2.8  -3.2  -2.1  -1.5  -1.3  -1.5  -0.5  -0.3 
Public debt/GDP (%)  23.0  23.8 22.9 22.2 21.2 19.4 18.6 18.2 
Gross national savings/ GDP ( %)   11.9 14.2 16.1 17.1 16.9 16.4 18.4 17.5 
Investment /GDP (%)  22  18.8  20.1 20.3 21.2 22.3 22.4 23.1 
Real  GDP  growth  (%)  -1.5 4.1 6.6 6.9  10.3 7.3 7.6 7.5 
BULGARIA 
Short –term interest rate – interbanking market  
(%)   5.88 4.63 5.06 4.91 3.68 3.74 3.62 3.69 
Rate of inflation  HICP (%)  2.60  10.30 7.40 5.80 2.30 6.10 6.00 7.40 
Real short –term interest rate – interbanking 
market  (%)  3.20 -5.14 -2.18 -0.84  1.35 -2.22 -2.25 -3.45 
Long –term interest rate (%)  -  :  : 8.26 6.42 5.25  3.8 4.01 
Real long –term interest rate (%)   -   -   -  2.33  4.03  -0.80  -2.08  -3.16 
Bank lending – annual change (%)   -   -   -   -   -   -   -   - 
Interest rate – bank deposits over 12 months.(%)    -    - 2.90 2.80 2.90 3.00 3.00    - 
Real interest rate – bank deposits over 12 
months.(%)   -   -  -4.19  -2.84  0.59  -2.92  -2.83   - 
Interest rate  – bank loans over 12 months (%)   -   -  11.10  9.40  8.80  8.80  7.90   - 
Real interest rate – bank loans over 12 months (%)   -   -  3.45  3.40  6.35  2.54  1.79   - 
Nominal currency rate (LEV/EUR)  1.96 1.96 1.96 1.96 1.96 1.96 1.96 1.96 
Real currency rate*  1.93  1.68 1.69 1.70 1.94 1.55 1.51 1.31 
Real effective currency rate  100.00 109.40 108.60 112.90 112.90 111.80 115.30 118.40 
Current  account  balance/GDP  (%)  -5.1 -5.5 -7.3 -5.6 -8.5 -5.8  -11.8  -15.80 
Foreign debt/GDP (%)    -   - 78.1 72.7 67.4 71.6 69.4 82.3 
Official reserves (mln EUR)  3206.8 3721.5 4082.6 4577.4 5405.2 6854.1 7368.5    - 
Dynamics of official reserves  100 116.1 109.7 112.1 118.1 126.8 107.5    - 
Official reserves/GDP (%)  26.4  27.2 26.8 27.5 30.4 34.5 33.7     
FDI flow/GDP (%)  5.9  7.9  5.1  3.9 10.5 13.7 15.7 16.4 
Net FDI/GDP (%)   -   -   -   -  10.5  9.1  14.5  15.9 
Net portfolio investment/GDP (%)   -   -   -   -  -1.1  -2  -5.9  0.4 
General government  
 balance/ GDP (%)   0.4  -0.5 1.9 0.1  -0.9 2.2 1.9 3.3 
Public debt/GDP (%)  79.3  73.6 66.2  54 45.9 37.9 29.2 22.8 
Gross national savings/ GDP ( %)   13.1 12.7 14.6 16.7 15.8 17.2 16.2 16.2 
  14Investment /GDP (%)  15.1  15.7 18.2 18.2 19.3 20.5 24.2 26.2 
Real GDP growth (%)  2.3  5.4 4.1 4.5 5.0 6.6 6.2 6.1 
EURO ZONE 
Short –term interest rate – interbanking market    2.96  4.39  4.26  3.32 2.33 2.11 2.19 3.08 
Rate of inflation  HICP (%)  1.1 2.1 2.3 2.2 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.2 
Real short –term interest rate – interbanking 
market  (%)  1.84 2.24 1.92 1.10 0.23 0.01  -0.01  0.8 
 
Source: Author’s own development on the basis of the data from: [Eurostat-epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu; 
Convergence Report, ECB, December 2006; Convergence Report, ECB, May 2006; European Economy, Spring 
2007, Statistical Annex; Transition Report update 2007, EBRD, May 2007]. 
 
In all three countries the main factor of inflation growth was high domestic and foreign 
demand for products from these countries, which is the main short-term stimulant of high 
economic growth. In the years 1999-2006, in Estonia the share of domestic demand in GDP 
changes was in the range from 8.5% to 16.6%, and the respective share for exports stood 
between 0.6% and 17.8%. In the years 1999-2006, in Lithuania the share of domestic demand 
in GDP changes was in the range from 2.5% to 12.9%, and that share for exports stood 
between 3.7% and 9%. In Bulgaria these ranges were: 9% – 12.3% and 4.9%-6.4%, 
respectively
28. To some extent inflation growth resulted also from the Samuelson-Balassa 
effect.  
 
Fiscal discipline characterized all three countries. In 2002, in Estonia there was a budget 
surplus. Bulgaria has reported a budget surplus since 2004. Lithuania reports budget deficit 
but it is low. All three countries are characterized by a low public debt to GDP ratio. 
 
The basic problem of the analyzed countries connected with the Euro zone accession was 
inflation. In view of this statement it raises doubts if these countries will manage to fulfill the 
criterion of price stability when they lack the policy of interest rates, which is imposed by the 
currency board system. If we treat inflation as an occurrence accompanying high economic 
growth, then a drop in domestic and foreign demand and a slowdown in economic growth 
should bring about the effect of reduced inflation. 
 
Furthermore, attention should be drawn to an increased risk of a possible financial crisis 
triggered off by external shocks. This danger is indicated by the following phenomena:: 
growing inflation and dropping real interest rates, growing current account deficit and foreign 
debt. On the other hand, the factors reducing this risk are clearly fiscal discipline, which is 
indicated by a low budget deficit to GDP ratio and a low public debt to GDP ratio as well as a 
tendency to increased official reserve levels and inflow of financial resources from the EU 
funds. The example of Argentina is frequently quoted as a country where the currency and 
financial crises appeared in the situation of the currency board system.
29 However, it must be 
borne in mind that this country noted high budget deficits and high public debt. These do not 
take place in the three examined countries. The foreign debt in the three countries in question 
refers to enterprises mainly, not to the state.
30 
 
Examples of Estonia, Lithuania and Bulgaria show the difficulties which a candidate country 
for the Euro zone may encounter in the situation of the currency board system and in the event 
of high economic growth and lack of possibility of controlling interest rates. 
 
                                                 
28 Data based on: [European Economy, Statistical Annex, Spring 2007, p. 197, 200, 203]. 
29 See: [Sławiński, 2007]. 
30 See: Transition Report update 2007, EBRD, May 2007. 
  15Poland has not defined the date of joining the ERM II and the Euro zone. The system of a 
floating exchange rate applied in Poland has proved to be a successful mechanism preventing 
currency crises, speculation attacks and providing foreign trade equilibrium. 
 
In Poland the pace of economic growth is lower than in the Baltic states (see Tables 2 and 3). 
This results, among others from a lower rate of gross national savings  and a lower rate of 
investments, which, to a large extent are the effects of the over-regulation of economy, a 
budget deficit and public debt, and a high tax burden (crowding-out effect). High public debt 
is the reason for a large spread, i.e. a difference between interest rates on credits and interest 
rates on deposits (see: Table 3). 
 
In the years 1999-2006, real interest rates were positive, which favored the inflow of foreign 
capital. The foreign capital inflow in the form of direct and portfolio investments as well as 
the EU funds have been one of the reasons (apart from the Samuelson-Balassa effect) for 
nominal and real appreciation of the zloty and increase in real effective exchange rates. In the 
years 1999-2006, the nominal exchange rate decreased by 7.8% whereas the real exchange-
rate dropped by 10.91% (calculations on the basis of Table 3). It is worth mentioning that 
growth of the real effective exchange rate in Poland is lower than in the Baltic states and in 
Bulgaria. 
 
A relatively high economic growth rate in the years 2003-2006, at too low a rate of national 
savings, nominal and real appreciation of the zloty led to maintaining a negative balance of 
the current account. However, the negative current account balance to GDP ratio in Poland is 
much lower than in the examined countries. In a similar way, a foreign debt to GDP ratio is 
lower in Poland than in Estonia and Bulgaria. 
 
An argument in favor of the currency board system implementation in Poland, which is raised 
in literature, is the possibility of avoiding speculation attacks in the period of stabilizing the 
zloty in the ERM II as well as keeping a tight rein on inflation. The problem of speculation 
attacks in the situation of a fixed exchange rate and capital mobility is a very important one, 
as it was outlined at the beginning of this paper. With the principle of free capital flows 
binding in the European Union, the National Bank of Poland is deprived of the possibility of 
controlling capital flows. 
 
Table 3. Economic performance in Poland, interest rate and inflation in euro zone euro, period:  1999 – 2006  
  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
POLAND 
Short –term interest rate – interbanking market  
(%)   14.73 18.77 16.07  8.98  5.68  6.2  5.28  4.21 
Rate of inflation  HICP (%)  7.20  10.1 5.3 1.9 0.7 3.6 2.2 1.3 
Real short –term interest rate – interbanking 
market  (%)  7.02 7.87  10.23 6.95 4.95 2.51 3.01 2.87 
Long –term interest rate (%)  9.53 11.79 10.68  7.32  5.78  6.92  5.23  5.26 
Real long –term interest rate (%)  2.17 1.53 5.11 5.32 5.04 3.20 2.96 3.91 
Bank lending – annual change (%)  26.7  17.0 7.4 4.2 7.1 3.1  15.1    - 
Interest rate – bank deposits over 12 months.(%)    -    - 8.00 4.20 2.90 3.70 2.70 2.50 
Real interest rate – bank deposits over 12 
months.(%)    -    - 2.56 2.26 2.18 0.10 0.49 1.18 
Interest rate  – bank loans over 12 months (%)   -   -  16.80  11.60  9.60  10.30  8.60  7.80 
Real interest rate  – bank loans over12 months 
(%)   -   -  10.92  9.52  8.84  6.47  6.26  6.42 
Nominal currency rate (PLN/EUR)  4.23 4.01 3.67 3.86 4.40 4.53 4.02 3.90 
Real currency rate*  3.94 3.31 3.15 3.58 4.25 3.66 3.45 3.51 
Real effective currency rate  100 106.5  124.91  113.94 96.19  91.5  103.32  107.75 
Current account balance/GDP (%)  -7.4 -5.8 -2.8 -2.6 -2.1 -4.2 -1.7 -2.3 
  16Foreign debt/GDP (%)     -    - 37.8 42.8 49.3 51.2 43.7 48.9 
Official reserves (mln EUR)  27245.8 29559.2 30295.5 28444.2 27181.6 26930.1 35968.4    - 
Dynamics of official reserves  100 108.5 102.5  93.9  95.6  99.1 133.6    - 
Official reserves/GDP (%)  17.3 15.9 14.3 13.6 14.2 13.2 14.7    - 
FDI flow/GDP (%)  4.3 5.5 3.0 2.1 2.2 4.9 3.2 4.1 
Net FDI/GDP (%)  4.3 5.5 3.0 2.0 2.1 4.6 2.2 2.9 
Net portfolio investment/GDP (%)  0.1 1.9 0.6 1.0 1.2 3.7 4.1  -0.8 
General government  
 balance/ GDP (%)   -1.8 -1.5 -3.7 -3.2 -6.3 -5.7 -4.3 -3.9 
Public debt/GDP (%)  40.3 36.8 36.7 39.8 47.1 45.7 47.1 47.8 
Gross national savings/ GDP ( %)   20.3 19.2 18.1 16.2 16.9 16.5 17.3 18.4 
Investment /GDP (%)  24.4 23.7 20.7 18.7 18.2 18.1 18.2 19.9 
Real GDP growth (%)  4.5 4.3 1.2 1.4 3.9 5.3 3.6 6.1 
EURO ZONE                         
Short –term interest rate – interbanking market    2.96 4.39 4.26 3.32 2.33 2.11 2.19 3.08 
Rate of inflation  HICP (%)  1.1 2.1 2.3 2.2 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.2 
Real short –term interest rate – interbanking 
market  (%)  1.84 2.24 1.92 1.10 0.23 0.01  -0.01 0.86 
Source: as in Table 1. 
 
The example of Slovenia shows that stabilization of an exchange rate within the ERM II is 
possible. Denmark is another example here. However, it must be emphasized that these are 
the countries of small financial markets whose attractiveness for speculation capital is 
relatively small. As the analysis of the currency board system functioning in the Baltic states 
and Bulgaria indicates, the said system does not protect against inflation growth in the 
situation of high pace of economic growth and high inflow of foreign capital. 
 
The following arguments  are against implementation of the currency board system in Poland: 
•  high share of non-tradables which means a higher impact of the Samuelson-Balassa 
effect than in small countries causing higher real currency appreciation; on the other 
hand, as experiences of the examined countries indicate the currency board system 
does not protect against real currency appreciation and increase in real effective 
exchange rates (in the countries examined the real effective exchange rate was at a 
higher level than in Poland in the years 1999-2006) 
•  low market flexibility (over-regulation), including labor and wage markets, which 
means a long period of adjustment in economy, especially after the economic shocks 
have occurred, 
•  high budget deficit and public debt (higher than in the examined countries) and a 
tendency to low fiscal discipline in government’s activities, 
•  inflation rate in Poland is at a relatively  low level (lower than in the examined 
countries) thanks to the relatively effective monetary policy of the National Bank of 
Poland (hence, there is no reason to fight inflation with the help of the currency board, 
which as the examples of the examined countries proved is not fully possible), 





Experiences of Estonia, Lithuania and Bulgaria connected with the currency board system do 
not encourage copying. As the carried out analysis indicates the system in question has 
numerous drawbacks and one can expect that they could be revealed more strongly in the 
Polish economy than in the analyzed countries as the former is much larger than the 
economies of the Baltic states or Bulgaria. Hence it seems that a much better solution for the 
countries planning to join the Euro zone is the standard solution of the type Denmark is 
  17implementing or Slovenia implemented not so long ago. The key  issue here is fulfillment of 
the fiscal stability criterion by a candidate country for the Euro zone. It requires a deep reform 
of public finances and not calculations. There is no possibility of effective stabilizing of the 
zloty to Euro exchange rate without fiscal stability. The reform is needed not only to benefit 
from joining the Euro zone but to create conditions for the long-term economic growth. 
 
The new EU countries which are candidates for the Euro zone  (including Poland) should 
stabilize their economies and implement deep reforms of institutional and structural character, 
which aim at raising market flexibility and international competitiveness of economy. To this 
end in-depth transformations of structural and institutional nature are indispensable. They 
include, among others: 
•  creation of institutional and structural conditions enabling efficient functioning  of 
market mechanism and market adjustment processes (privatization, demonopolization 
and deregulation in order to ensure more economic freedom as well as flexibility of 
markets, prices and wages,a  lesser tax burden for population and enterprises, creation 
of an effective system of economic law and its implementation; 
•  in-depth reform of public finance aiming at budget reduction on both revenue- and 
expenditure side, which would radically reduce  the budget deficit and, in the long run, 
public debt; indispensable changes in the budget expenditure structure (increased 
expenditures on education, research, infrastructure, improved functioning of law while 
others are reduced), a lower tax burden for population and enterprises; 
•  introduction of mechanisms preventing future increases in the budget deficit and 
public debt; 
In the period of the exchange rate stabilization within the ERM II, countries should run 
monetary policy targeted at price stability and exchange rate stability or subordinated to 
exchange rate stability which practically means price stability and stable interest rates. There 
is no evidence, however, that such policy will be effective in the case of medium-sized 
countries like Poland. 
 
In this context a question can be formulated whether exchange rate stability is actually 
indispensable in order to join the Euro zone. More and more arguments are raised against this. 
The most relevant ones are those of a price stability and fiscal stability criterion. Exchange 
rate stability within the ERM II for two years may not be accomplished and then the exchange 
rate crisis is likely to occur in a given country. W. H. Buiter raised this issue. He is of the 
opinion that if the country being a candidate for the Euro zone completed the disinflation 
process and fulfilled the fiscal stability criterion, then the date of the Euro zone accession and 
the conversion rate can be determined.
31 It is a suggestion which is worth considering. Such a 
solution would not expose candidate countries to potential exchange rate crises. A similar 
opinion was expressed by A. Sławiński who pointed to the fact that at the above mentioned 
solution trade deficits of the candidate countries targeting at the Euro zone become only the 
indices of their economic situation and not a source of investors’ fears or an increased risk of 
the exchange rate crisis occurrence.
32 Adoption of such a solution is particularly important for 




                                                 
31 See: [Buiter, 2004]. 
32 See: [Sławiński, 2007]. 
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